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WHAT BERGSON SHOULD 
HAVE SAID TO EINSTEIN1
Steven SAVITT
Let me begin by repeating (changing only the name) a paragraph from a 
recent paper by David Chalmers:
I should say that I am not a historian or a serious scholar of Bergson. These 
are merely some speculative remarks not well-grounded in scholarly attention 
to Bergson’s texts. But I think the speculative question is interesting. I’m going 
to sketch one speculative answer. I’m going to be interested to hear from people 
who know much more about Bergson than I do about whether this speculation 
has any remote plausibility. If the historical speculation has none, as may well 
be possible, I think there is still a very interesting philosophical project in the 
neighbourhood which is itself worthy of attention (Chalmers 2018).
My speculative remarks concern the famous debate between Henri 
Bergson and Albert Einstein that took place in Paris on 6 April 1922. 
This encounter has recently received a book-length treatment (Canales 
2015), but little of the substance of the debate was actually reported in 
it. Einstein and Bergson disagreed, unsurprisingly, as to whether time is 
better understood through scientific or philosophical examination.2 But in 
1. This paper, aside from minor editorial changes, was delivered at the Reasssessing 
Bergson conference held in Cambridge, England on 11-12 September 2019. I am 
grateful to the co-organisers of the conference (Theo Borgvin-Weiss, Florian Fischer, 
Matyáš Moravec, Sam Sokolsky-Tifft, and Zoe Walker) for inviting me to this meeting. 
While my paper was in press, it has come to my attention (4 June 2020) that a second 
paper arguing that Bergson should have embraced local passage in relativistic spacetimes 
(Kügler, 2020) was published online by Synthese (28 May 2020). It was received by that 
journal 11 December 2019.
2. Indeed, as we shall see, Canales (2015) cites this debate as one of the sources of the 
increasing gulf between scientific and humanistic treatments of time in the 20th century.
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regard specifically to Bergson’s views concerning time in the special theory 
of relativity, we have the evidence of a book he wrote on that topic at 
the time of the debate, Duration and Simultaneity.3 My remarks in this 
paper primarily concern claims of Bergson in that book, claims that deal 
specifically with time in the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and I will 
leave it to others, should they wish, to tease out their implications for some 
of Bergson’s more general theses concerning time.
STR is well-known for showing that certain quantities or relations (length, 
mass, simultaneity) that were regarded as frame-invariant or absolute 
in pre-relativistic physics are actually frame-dependent or relative. One 
standard and striking illustration of these novel and unintuitive ideas is 
the so-called “twin paradox.”4 One way of presenting the “paradox” is to 
imagine a pair of identical twins. One travels to a distant galaxy on a rocket 
ship at very high speed and then returns to earth at the same high speed. 
The other remains on earth. STR implies that the travelling twin on their 
return will have aged less than the stay-at-home twin.
Bergson did not accept this conclusion. In fact, he argued that (1) The 
clock paradox is false. The sort of behavior described in the clock paradox 
will not in fact occur using clocks in our world. (2) The clock paradox 
results from a misunderstanding of STR. Therefore, one can deny that 
the behavior described in the clock paradox would actually occur while 
accepting all of STR (that is, all the valid mathematical/physical core of 
STR) itself.
I think that any fair-minded reader of Duration and Simultaneity will 
agree that Bergson argued for (1) and (2) above. Let me give just one bit 
of textual evidence (from the third Appendix to the second edition) that 
supports both claims.
In short, there is nothing to change in the mathematical expression of the theory 
of relativity. But physics would render a service to philosophy by giving up certain 
ways of speaking which lead the philosopher into error, and which risk fooling 
the physicist himself regarding the metaphysical implications of his views. For 
3. Duration and Simultaneity was first published in French in 1922 as Durée et 
Simultanéité. A second edition was published in 1923 with three important appendices 
added. The English translation that I cite throughout was published in 1965.
4. I prefer to refer to it by the more generic term the clock paradox. Of course, it is not 
a paradox at all; it is just one of the many counter-intuitive implications of STR. For 
an illuminating, at-the-time-comprehensive discussion of failed responses to the clock 
paradox see Marder (1971). For a sophisticated modern philosophical account of the 
“paradox” see (Arthur, 2019, chapters 5 and 6).
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example, we are told above that “if two identical, synchronised clocks are at the 
same spot in the system of reference, if we shift one very rapidly and then bring 
it back again next to the other at the end of time t (the time of the system), it 
will lag behind the other […].” In reality, we should say that the moving clock 
exhibits this slowing at the precise instant at which it touches, still moving, the 
motionless system and is about to re-enter it. But immediately upon re-entering, 
it points to the same time as the other […] (Bergson 1965,185).
Unfortunately, claims (1) and (2) are incorrect. In 1971 an experiment was 
done that directly tested the clock “paradox.” It was reported in a two-part 
paper. I will simply quote the abstracts to the two parts:
During October 1971, four cesium beam atomic clocks were flown on regularly 
scheduled commercial jet flights around the world twice, once eastward and once 
westward, to test Einstein’s theory of relativity with macroscopic clocks. From 
the actual flight paths of each trip, the theory predicts that the flying clocks, 
compared with reference clocks at the U.S. Naval Observatory, should have lost 
40 ± 23 nanoseconds during the eastward trip, and should have gained 275 ± 
21 nanoseconds during the westward trip. The observed time differences are 
presented in the report that follows this one (Hafele, J. C. and R. Keating, 1972a). 
Four caesium beam clocks flown around the world on commercial jet flights 
during October 1971, once eastward and once westward, recorded directionally 
dependent time differences which are in good agreement with predictions of 
conventional relativity theory. Relative to the atomic time scale of the U.S. Naval 
Observatory, the flying clocks lost 59 ± 10 nanoseconds during the eastward trip 
and gained 273 ± 7 nanoseconds during the westward trip, where the errors are 
the corresponding standard deviations. These results provide an unambiguous 
empirical resolution of the famous clock “paradox” with macroscopic clocks 
(Hafele, J. C. and R. Keating, 1972b).
So, thesis (1) above is false. As for (2), it is important to see not just that it 
is false, but also how central it is to STR that it is false. To that end, choose 
an arbitrary point p in the spacetime of the special theory of relativity, 
Minkowski spacetime (choosing a point in spacetime means specifying 
four coordinates — three spatial and one temporal). And then choose a 
second point q such that a material clock can travel from p to q without 
ever exceeding the speed of light. These two points are said to be timelike 
separated, with q future to p. The path from p to q in spacetime is called a 
future-directed timelike curve.
The Hafele and Keating experiment shows empirically that for two clocks 
starting at a given point p and meeting later at a given point q the same 
time will in general not have elapsed for them along distinct future-directed 
timelike curves. This result is known as the path dependence of (proper) time.
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Suppose that (proper) time were not path dependent in this way. That is, 
suppose that the elapsed time indicated by the two clocks travelling along 
different timelike curves from p to q were always the same. Then if one 
assigned some time to p (let us say 0) and if it took both clocks the same 
time t to reach q, one could assign that time t to q unambiguously. But 
since q was chosen arbitrarily, one could evidently assign a definite time 
unambiguously to every point in spacetime. That would in turn enable 
one to collect together into sets all points in the spacetime that are assigned 
a given time, all points or events that are simultaneous. That is, one could 
divide or slice or foliate the whole of the spacetime unambiguously or 
uniquely into sets of simultaneous points (simultaneity slices).
A spacetime with this structure is called Galilean spacetime.5 It is the 
spacetime perhaps best adapted to be the setting of Newton’s mechanics, 
but it has too much structure (the unique same-time slices or surfaces) 
to be Minkowski spacetime, the spacetime of STR. So, denying the path 
dependence of (proper) time is flatly inconsistent with STR.6 The path-
dependence of time is, then, central to STR. The clock paradox is merely 
one specific manifestation of the path-dependence of time, so the clock 
paradox is central to STR. To deny its centrality, as Bergson did, is a mistake.
According to Canales, Bergson paid dearly for this mistake. He enjoyed 
rock-star celebrity in 1922 but died in obscurity. 
By the time Bergson died on January 3, 1941, the event was particularly shocking 
because the world had already fallen into the habit of thinking of him as dead. 
His debate with Einstein precipitated the vertiginous downward fall (Canales 
2015, 31).
What I wish to say here, tentatively, is that it need not have been so. 
Bergson did not play the cards that were in his philosophical hand as 
well as he could have in the debate with Einstein (and in Duration and 
Simultaneity). It might well have been better for him personally and for the 
course of philosophy in the 20th century if he had. I will now try to make 
this case, but I would like to lay it out in a slightly round-about manner.
5. See Chapter 3 of Geroch (1978). The reader might find Figures 34 and 35 and the 
surrounding discussion in that book helpful. In general, the book provides a very helpful 
non-technical introduction to the notion of spacetime structure.
6. Čapek (1971) claims that “Bergson was right as long as we remain within the 
framework of the special theory of relativity” (p. 246). The common mistake that the 
general theory of relativity is required to remove the apparent paradoxical nature of the 
clock “paradox” is effectively dealt with in the book by Marder referred to above.
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First, I think that any fair-minded reader of Duration and Simultaneity 
would have to conclude that Bergson made a serious and sustained effort to 
understand STR. The theory was accepted by the community of theoretical or 
mathematical physicists surprising rapidly, but it was nevertheless a complex 
and counter-intuitive theory that still has the power to unsettle anyone who 
studies it. In the century since its advent, its central ideas have been clearly 
distinguished and the arguments for or derivations of the odd relativistic 
effects have been simplified and polished.7 It’s much easier for us now to see 
what is essential to STR than it would have been for Bergson then.
It is not shocking, then, that he took an essential idea of STR for an 
optional philosophical gloss. He doubtless had salient reasons for 
(erroneously) convincing himself of this view; but I also think that he had 
sufficient respect for experiment to believe that, had it been possible to 
do an experiment like the Hafele and Keating experiment in, say, 1920, 
he would have accepted the result. Two real clocks make round-the-world 
trips in each direction. Neither of them is imaginary. I do not know what 
exactly led Bergson to reject the twin thought-experiment, to reject that 
idea (as I would like to put it now) that there could be real time along 
two trajectories in (Minkowski) spacetime between a pair of events, even 
though the times measured along the world lines were not the same. But I 
do think — or at least I would like to conjecture — that had he seen the 
evidence against (1) above, he would have changed his mind. 
By the 1970s the state of knowledge had changed considerably from that of 
1923. The question to ponder is not, I submit, whether Bergson would have 
changed his mind about the clock paradox, but how would he have changed 
it? I will hazard one conjecture, but I am aware that many others are possible.
Consider this aphorism from Duration and Simultaneity: “[T]ime is 
succession” (Bergson 1965, 65). Let us ask ourselves what Bergson could 
say if he had been asked (or had asked himself ): a succession of what? 
Most philosophers of time — and probably most non-philosophers as well 
— would after some thought suppose that time is a succession of sets or 
collections of simultaneous instantaneous events spanning the universe. 
(There might be some hesitation as to whether the events are instantaneous 
or have some small duration, but that choice makes no difference to my 
7. For an elegant popular introduction to all the standard STR phenomena, see Mermin 
(1968). Mermin discusses the clock paradox on pages 187-194 in a version involving 
three inertial observers (and so no acceleration). It is remarkably instructive to calculate in 
detail the example from the perspective of each of the three clocks or “observers.”
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story in this paper.) These sets of events occur one after another. That is, 
they occur successively. This succession is the unfolding or happening or 
history of the universe.8
This answer would not be available to Bergson. A global or universe-wide 
set of simultaneous events is what he would call — if I understand him 
correctly — a snapshot of the universe. The idea that time is the succession 
of such snapshots is precisely the cinematographic conception of time that 
he castigated in Creative Evolution. He might, of course, reconsider that old 
view of his, but a reconsideration in light of STR makes it less, rather than 
more, plausible. In STR, at any given spatio-temporal location there is no 
special (or “metaphysically privileged”9) snapshot. There are only an infinite 
number of equally non-special snapshots. This multiplicity does not provide 
an attractive foundation on which to build a metaphysics of time.
I believe there is a better choice for Bergson. Consider the two paths followed 
by two clocks connecting events p and q. Each path is a set of events that 
occur successively. Each path could be the path of a space traveler.10 Instead 
of trying to confine real or lived time to just one such path,11 allow real or 
lived time, at least potentially, along each path. Embracing the twins rather 
than rejecting them is surely a step in the right direction, a recognition of 
what STR says and the weight of evidence in its favour.
But, of course, this step raises new questions. What of triplets? There is 
no reason to stop at two, it seems. Each of their three paths in spacetime 
would be sets of events that occur successively. To put this point another 
way, suppose there were three distinct time-like curves connecting points 
p and q. Then there would be in general three distinct (proper) times along 
each such world line, each potentially equally “real” or lived or genuine. 
But once this line of thought is started, one should see that there is no 
natural finite end to it. There is no non-arbitrary upper bound on the 
number of time-like curves connecting p and q (or any other pair of points 
in spacetime) with associated proper times.
8. Bergson speaks of “the singleness of an impersonal time. Such is the hypothesis of 
common sense” (Bergson 1965, 47). He goes on to imply that Einstein supports this 
hypothesis.
9. A notion that is often invoked but rarely explained.
10. Allowing for the fact that, if the space traveler is human, some paths have accelerations 
that humans cannot survive.
11. “The real is that which is measured by a real physicist, and the imaginary, that which 
is represented in the mind of the real physicist as measured by imaginary physicists” 
(Bergson 1965, 79).
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Why not, then, trade the constricted or anemic conception of lived time 
that we find in Duration and Simultaneity (lived time on one time-like 
curve, ghostly time on the others) for a robust conception of genuine time 
flourishing equally on all time-like world lines?12 Of course, this need not 
presuppose or entail that all time-like worldlines are the paths in spacetime 
of conscious “observers” or clocks. It would entail or presuppose that all 
such worldlines are potentially the paths of such “observers” or clocks. On 
this view, Minkowski spacetime would teem with times.13
I have to say “times” because, as noted above, time is path dependent and 
there is a non-denumerable infinity of paths connecting any two time-
like separated points like p and q in the discussion above. Although this 
plurality of times may seem philosophically puzzling, any account of time 
(or at least any that I am acquainted with) brings some philosophical 
puzzles in its train. But there is also a great philosophical advantage as 
well. This point of view is a necessary corrective to the mistake, often made 
by physicists as well as philosophers and historians,14 that the spacetime of 
STR is somehow “static” or a “block universe.” Here, for instance, is the 
opinion of one eminent philosopher, Sir Karl Popper:
And a deterministic system such as the field theory of Einstein might even be 
described as a four-dimensional version of Parmenides’ unchanging three-
dimensional universe. For in a sense no change occurs in Einstein’s four-
dimensional block-universe. Everything is there just as it is, in its four-dimensional 
locus; change becomes a kind of “apparent” change; it is “only” the observer who 
as it were glides along his world-line and becomes successively conscious of the 
different loci along this world-line; that is, of his spatio-temporal surroundings 
(Popper 1962, 80).
This sort of (confused, I suggest) idea is no doubt one that lies behind (or 
beneath) disputes about time that continue to this day. As Canales says, 
As the [20th] century drew to a close, the “time of the universe” and “lived time” 
appeared as irreconcilable as science and philosophy in ways that exceeded the 
discussion that took place that day (Canales 2015, 348).
12. This picture is fleshed out and defended in Savitt (2009) and Savitt (2020). See also 
Rovelli (2019). 
13. And Bergson did write “We believe that a philosophy in which duration is considered 
real and even active can quite readily admit Minkowski’s and Einstein’s space-time […]” 
(Bergson 1965, 63). 
14. Canales for instance, writes that “Einstein’s theory […] on its own […] describes 
a universe where our sense of time passing by us was an illusion” (Canales 2015, 275).
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But this source of division (and confusion) could have been scotched by 
Bergson. Had Bergson accepted the result of the clock paradox, he could 
have correctly pointed out to Einstein that Minkowski spacetime, far from 
being a static or so-called “block universe,” is chock-a-block (as it were) 
with temporal dynamism.15 For all I know, by the way, he could have been 
the first to point this out, thus gaining (from my point of view at least) a 
far more significant place in the history of philosophy and physics of time 
than he has today.
Students of Bergson may suspect that he could not have changed his 
views regarding STR in the way I have suggested without altering other, 
very fundamental views, as well. They may be right. My reflections above 
concern the behaviour of clocks — more specifically, the behaviour of 
ideal clocks on timelike world lines. For Bergson, such behaviour is only 
indirectly indicative of anything at all about time itself. Here’s a typical 
remark in this vein:
It is therefore the simultaneity between two instants of two motions outside of us 
that enables us to measure time; but it is the simultaneity of these moments with 
moments pricked by them along our inner duration that makes this measurement 
one of time (Bergson 1965, 54).
The root idea here is, I believe, that time, real time, is accessible to our 
consciousness whereas the quantity measured by clocks is some sort of 
derivative quantity or secondary shadow of genuine duration. I think this 
view is deeply mistaken. We humans are clocks, albeit not particularly 
good clocks compared to today’s best. We measure imperfectly what they 
measure far more exactly. We can experience what they measure in a way 
that, presumably, they cannot; but what we and they are responding to 
is one and the same, nonetheless. I cannot prove this, and it will not be 
possible to argue the point in any detail within the confines of this article.16 
The best I can do in this short compass, I think, is to quote a perceptive 
statement of a view more like the one I favor by Ernst Cassirer:
For Newton it was certain that the absolute and mathematical time, which by 
its nature flowed uniformly, was the “true” time of which all empirically given 
temporal determination can offer us only a more or less imperfect copy; for 
Bergson, this “true” time of Newton is a conceptual fiction and abstraction, a 
15. Čapek (1971, 252) writes that Bergson “failed to see that the relativistic space-time, 
correctly interpreted, far from implying the elimination of becoming, reintroduces it into 
the physical world.” Either Bergson failed to see this correct interpretation, or he thought 
that it had philosophical costs that he was reluctant to pay, as I suggest below.
16. And I note that one can find a different view of the matter in During (2008).
What Bergson Should Have Said to Einstein 97
barrier, which intervenes between our apprehension and the original meaning 
and import of reality. But it is forgotten that what is here called absolute reality, 
durée réelle, is itself no absolute but only signifies a standpoint of consciousness 
opposed to that of mathematics and physics. In the one case, we seek to gain a 
unitary and exact measure for all objective process, in the other we are concerned 
in retaining this process itself in its pure qualitative character, in its concrete 
fullness and subjective inwardness and “contentuality.” The two standpoints can 
be understood in their meaning and necessity; neither suffices to include the 
actual whole of being in the idealistic sense of “being for us.” The symbols that 
the mathematician and physicist take as a basis in their view of the outer and the 
psychologist in his view of the inner, must both be understood as symbols. Until 
this has come about the true philosophical view, the view of the whole, is not 
reached, but a partial experience is hypostasised into the whole (Cassirer 1923).17 
A recurring theme in Canales’s book is that the disagreement between 
Bergson and Einstein regarding time is one of the sources of the 20th-
century rift between continental and analytic (or humanistic and science/
logic inspired) philosophical schools. I am not enough of a historian to 
have an informed opinion on this matter.18 But insofar as she is correct, 
then I suggest that that source of the rift was spurious. Bergson could have 
replaced his tortured denials of the clock paradox with a recognition that 
succession along time-like worldlines is dynamic and, at least potentially, 
lived. I contend that neither humanists nor scientists need dissent.
Čapek ends his chapter on Bergson and Einstein by noting that “it is clear 
that to separate what is living from what is dead in Bergson’s interpretation 
of relativity theory is a complex task.” My minimal hope is to convince the 
reader at least that Bergson’s denial of the clock paradox is a dead element 
of his thought. My maximal hope is that reflection upon the clock paradox 
and STR will lead those who are sympathetic to Bergson’s ideas to look more 
skeptically on his privileging one side of a deeply complex phenomenon 
(time only as psychological time) to a balanced appreciation of the whole 
(time as experienced by us and the same time as measured by clocks).
17. This quote appears on pages 454-455 of the Supplement to Cassirer’s Substance 
and Function, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity considered from the Epistemological 
Standpoint,” which first appeared in German in 1921. I quote from the English translation 
by William C. Swabey and Marie C. Swabey, which was first published by the Open 
Court Publishing Co. in 1923 and which was reprinted by Dover Publications in 1953.
18. For a different, but possibly complementary, account, see Friedman (2000).
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***
Abstract: In the famous 1922 debate with Einstein, Bergson was mistaken in his 
rejection of the so-called twin or clock “paradox.” Consistent with at least one of his core 
beliefs (that time is succession) Bergson could have maintained that there is genuine time 
along each twin’s worldline in a relativistic spacetime, since there is succession (of events) 
along every such world line. Had he taken such a stance, we might have been spared the 
confused idea that relativistic spacetimes are (or represent) static or “block” universes. 
Moreover, in a recent book on the debate Jimena Canales claims that the Einstein/
Bergson difference was one of the sources of the rift between continental and analytic 
(or at least science-oriented) philosophy. Insofar as her claim is true, my argument entails 
that the rift has a spurious origin. Recognition of this fact by contemporary Bergsonians 
might help to close or bridge it.
Keywords: Bergson, Einstein, temporal becoming, special relativity, twin paradox.
Résumé : Lors du célèbre débat de 1922 avec Einstein, Bergson s’est trompé en rejetant 
le “paradoxe” des jumeaux ou de l’horloge. En accord avec au moins une de ses croyances 
fondamentales (le temps est une succession), Bergson aurait pu soutenir qu’il existe un 
temps réel dans la ligne d’univers (worldline) de chaque jumeau dans un espace-temps 
relativiste, puisqu’il existe une succession (d’événements) dans chaque ligne d’univers. S’il 
avait adopté une telle position, on nous aurait épargné l’idée confuse que les espaces-temps 
relativistes sont (ou représentent) des univers statiques ou “en bloc.” De plus, dans un livre 
récent sur le débat, Jimena Canales affirme que la controverse entre Einstein et Bergson a 
été l’une des sources du fossé entre la philosophie continentale et analytique (ou du moins 
la philosophie orientée vers la science). Dans la mesure où cette affirmation est vraie, mon 
argument implique que ce clivage a une origine fallacieuse. La reconnaissance de ce fait par 
les bergsoniens contemporains pourrait contribuer à le combler ou à le faire disparaître. 
Mots-clés : Bergson, Einstein, devenir temporel, relativité restreinte, paradoxe des jumeaux.

